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India’s Role as a Facilitator of 
Constitutional Democracy*
Hiroaki Shiga1
Abstract How can the unique knowledge, experiences, institutions, norms, 
and ideas from developing countries contribute to the political, economic, 
and social development of other developing countries? This question is 
worth asking, as ongoing discussions regarding emerging donors have 
failed to explore the possible contribution of developing countries to 
governance issues through the utilisation of their unique resources. This 
article examines the realities and potential of India’s contribution to 
the enhancement of democratic governance in developing countries. It 
argues that India’s enduring experience with constitutional democracy has 
attracted attention from other developing countries, particularly those 
who are tackling the daunting challenge of consolidating democracy in 
tandem with the projects of building a coherent nation and legitimate and 
functioning state within the inherently hostile environment of an ethnically 
and religiously divided society. 
Keywords: India, emerging donor, democratic governance, democracy 
promotion, constitution, constitutional democracy.
1 Introduction
How can the unique experiences, institutions, norms, and ideas 
of  developing countries contribute to the development and good 
governance of  other developing countries? This question has been left 
unexplored in the ongoing discussions about the so-called ‘emerging 
donors’ that have gained impetus since the mid-2000s. Worse still, 
we have witnessed persistent speculation that, through their alleged 
indifference and negligence of  ‘good governance’ issues such as 
democracy, rule of  law, human rights, and anti-corruption, emerging 
donors are spoiling the concerted efforts of  traditional donors to 
improve governance in developing countries (Naím 2007). 
A notable exception to the general lack of  interest and research into 
developing countries’ positive contributions to governance issues is 
the recent attention in Western literature given to the role India plays 
in facilitating democratic governance. I would argue, however, that 
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conventional literature fails to duly evaluate the holistic picture of  
India’s contribution to the promotion of  democracy. My main argument 
is that India’s enduring experience of  constitutional democracy offers 
an attractive model for other developing countries facing the triple 
challenge of  building a legitimate state, a cohesive nation with a 
sense of  national unity, and a sustainable democracy, and that India’s 
potential as a promoter of  democratic governance is promising.
2 Review of conventional literature 
2.1 Background on the recent attention given to India
Since the 2010s, Western observers have begun to pay more attention 
to India’s role in the enhancement of  democratic governance. A major 
factor that facilitated this increase in attention was the slowdown of  
the global trend towards democratisation in the 2000s. Contrary to the 
Western euphoria that saw democracy gain a ‘near universal normative 
acceptance’ (McFaul 2004), the ‘Third Wave of  democratisation’ 
(Huntington 1993) lost momentum in the 2000s. Many countries failed 
to consolidate their democracy and some slid back to authoritarianism. 
Currently, we are witnessing a world where ‘the resilience of  undemocratic 
regimes and the trend towards authoritarianism has become the global 
rule’ (Burnell and Schlumberger 2011: 3). The democratisation of  Iraq 
by force in 2003 was fatal to Western-led efforts for the promotion of  
democracy as it ‘tarnished its reputation beyond repair’ (Whitehead 2009: 
215). Western countries were driven into a situation in which they could 
not go back to the excessive self-confidence of  the 1990s but nonetheless 
were not able to discard the normative commitment to the promotion of  
democracy (Whitehead 2009: 225). Thus, Western countries began to look 
for a reliable partner to help reverse the ‘trend towards authoritarianism’. 
It was exactly at this time that Western policymakers and academics 
interpreted several signs from the Indian government as showing a 
significant change in the Indian traditional diplomatic posture towards 
the promotion of  democracy. Before the 2000s, India never presented 
itself  in the international arena as an active and principled promoter 
of  democracy.2 ‘Non-interference’ had been one of  the main pillars 
of  Indian diplomacy and aid policy (Kondoh et al. 2010), and India 
carefully eschewed the role of  ‘proselytising’ an authoritarian regime 
into a democratic one.3
The first sign of  change appeared in its neighbourhood policy. In the 
face of  protracted socio-political instability and civil war in Nepal, 
India proactively engaged in the peaceful settlement of  the civil war 
and democratisation of  Nepal in cooperation with Western nations 
including the United States.4 In 2005, India showed another sign 
of  change by taking the lead in establishing the United Nations 
Democratisation Fund (UNDEF) in cooperation with the United 
States; since then it has been the second-largest contributor only after 
the United States. In his address at the launch ceremony of  UNDEF, 
the then Indian prime minister, Manmohan Singh, emphasised the 
significance of  democracy in facilitating development:
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Poverty, illiteracy or socioeconomic backwardness do not hinder the 
exercise of  democracy. Quite the contrary, our experience of  more 
than fifty years of  democratic rule demonstrates how democracy 
is a most powerful tool to successfully overcome the challenge of  
development… India has been sharing its rich experience, institutional 
capabilities, and training infrastructure with nations that share our 
values and beliefs and request our assistance. We are prepared to do 
much more, both as active participants in the Democracy Fund and in 
the Community of  Democracies (Singh 2005).
Singh’s depiction of  democracy as the ‘most powerful tool’ in 
overcoming the challenge of  development was interpreted by Western 
observers as a remarkable change in India’s long-standing commitment 
to ‘non-interference’ and as a sign of  proactive engagement in the 
Western-led enterprise of  democratisation. It was expected on the 
Western side that ‘shared values and adherence to democracy’ would 
work as ‘natural common ground for closer cooperation’ in the 
promotion of  democratic governance (Kugiel 2012: 1). 
2.2 Review of conventional literature
Against this background, much of  the conventional literature is 
motivated by the same research question: ‘Will India be a reliable 
Western partner in the promotion of  democracy?’ The title of  a 
publication by Carothers and Youngs (2011), Looking for Help: Will Rising 
Democracies Become International Democracy Supporters?, succinctly describes 
the shared concern of  Western authors. However, the prognosis in 
the conventional literature is gloomy. They are almost unanimous in 
concluding that India will not be a principled partner in promoting 
democracy, at least in the near future, and that the Indian model of  
democracy is not attractive due to its defective nature. 
An example of  this comes from Burnell and Schlumberger (2011: 11) 
who criticise India’s commitment to the promotion of  democracy as 
still being quite weak. They argue that in order for the Western-led 
promotion of  democracy, which was tarnished in Iraq, to regain 
international legitimacy, regional actors such as India should stand at 
the front line; they also argue that India’s initiative in South Asia will 
be an important barometer for determining whether democracy or 
authoritarianism would be a dominant direction in the future. Likewise, 
Grävingholt et al. (2011: 1) argue that India is making no significant 
contribution to the enhancement of  democracy in its neighbourhood 
and hardly acts as a democratic counterbalance to China and Russia. In 
sum, the literature argues that India still does not contribute in a visible 
manner to the West’s concerted effort to undertake a counteroffensive 
against the ‘trend towards authoritarianism’ (Burnell and Schlumberger 
2011: 3) by proselytising undemocratic regimes. 
To date, there has been only a limited assessment of  those Indian 
activities for the promotion of  democracy that fall within the category 
of  development aid (South–South cooperation). Many commentators 
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discuss India’s comparative advantage in delivering democracy 
assistance and recommend that India’s rich experience in organising 
and monitoring elections should be shared with other developing 
countries (Faust and Wagner 2010: 4; Kugiel 2012). No reference is 
made to India’s development aid for institution-building or capacity 
development, which are both indispensable for democratic governance. 
Regarding the possibility that India could serve as an ‘exemplar’ of  
democracy for other developing countries and thus differentiate itself  
both from a ‘crusading and domineering West and a cynical China’ 
(Mohan 2011), the assessment in conventional literature is also pessimistic. 
For example, Faust and Wagner point to Indian ‘political deficiencies’ 
such as clientelism, patronage, and corruption, and argue that ‘only a 
credible domestic assault on bad governance will be able to promote the 
basis of  [India’s] international soft power’ (2010: 4). 
3 Causes of the underestimation of India’s role in the promotion of 
democracy 
Both the reality and the potential of  India’s role in democracy promotion 
are underestimated in the conventional understanding. The defects in 
conventional literature are twofold: first, conventional literature tends 
to focus narrowly on the role of  a foreign state in the ‘proselytising’ 
of  authoritarian regimes into democracy; this leaves India’s active 
development aid for the consolidation of  democracy, as well as its 
potential to serve as an ‘exemplar’ of  democracy, virtually unexplored.
Second, conventional literature employs a minimalistic definition 
of  democracy that places weight on the right of  people to choose 
their leaders by means of  regular, free, and fair elections (Diamond 
2009: 21). This narrow definition of  democracy, which leaves the 
imminent danger of  majoritarian democracy and the importance of  
the sound development of  constitutional democracy in divided societies 
unattended, unfortunately excludes India’s contribution to democracy 
promotion. For, as we shall see later, constitutional democracy is the 
very mode of  democracy for which India has been serving as a model 
for other developing countries.
3.1 Problems in the scope of research
The first defect in conventional literature relates to its scope, as it fails 
to assess the holistic picture of  India’s contribution to democracy 
promotion. 
In general, as an external actor, a state can contribute to the 
enhancement of  democratic governance in other countries in 
various ways (see Table 1). A state can cajole, prod, or even pressure 
authoritarian regimes into democratising, or it can mediate negotiation 
among conflict parties and thus facilitate democratic transition. After 
the transition, a state can facilitate democratic consolidation by assisting 
with institution-building and capacity development within various 
organisations, which is essential for democracy to function. There 
is an abundance of  policy instruments available: a state can employ 
IDS Bulletin Vol. 49 No. 3 July 2018: ‘Emerging Economies and the Changing Dynamics of Development Cooperation’ 93–110 | 97
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
military intervention or economic sanctions, or extend development aid. 
Much less focused, but nonetheless an important contribution to the 
enhancement of  democracy, are cases where a state serves as a model to 
garner interest and be studied and emulated by other countries. 
In conventional literature on the various options, the focus tends to 
be on the phase of  democratic transition – a revolutionary phase of  
democratisation in which the incumbent authoritarian regime is toppled 
Table 1 Multiple ways to contribute to democratic governance
Type Example Phase Nature of state 
action
Active promotion 
of democracy
Vis-à-vis 
undemocratic 
regimes
Exerting pressure 
on the leadership 
of undemocratic 
regimes by 
sanctions, etc.
Western sanctions 
to Myanmar 
military regime
Democratic 
transition
Strategic and 
diplomatic
Mediation and 
brokering of 
democratic 
transition
US and India’s 
engagements in 
democratisation 
of Nepal in the 
2000s
Assistance to 
anti-government 
political parties, 
non-governmental 
organisations, and 
mass media
US engagements 
in the ‘colour 
revolutions’ in 
the former Soviet 
Union
Development aid
(South–South 
cooperation)
Vis-à-vis 
democratic /
democratising 
regimes
Assistance to 
democratic 
institution-
building and 
democracy-
related capacity 
development 
of government 
and civil society 
organisations
Poland’s assistance 
to Ukraine, 
Belarus, Moldova, 
and Georgia 
(Petrova 2012). 
Democratic 
consolidation
Provision of 
expertise 
and materials 
necessary for 
democratic 
procedures 
(i.e. elections)
Japan’s election 
assistances
Serving as 
a model of 
democracy
Unique norms, ideas, institutions, and 
practices are studied and emulated by 
other countries
India’s role as 
a model of 
constitutional 
democracy
Democratic 
transition and 
consolidation
No state action 
required 
Source Author’s own.
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and power is transferred to the democrats. They regard visible measures 
for facilitating democratic transition, such as diplomatic pressure, 
sanctions on authoritarian regimes, or direct support for democratically 
minded forces, as evidence of  a principled commitment to the cause of  
global democratisation. 
The unfortunate consequence of  this tendency to focus on the more 
radical measures is that much less attention has been paid to those 
methods that facilitate the long and difficult process of  democratic 
consolidation after transition,5 not to mention India’s role as a model of  
democracy for other developing countries. This has a pernicious effect 
on the fair evaluation of  India’s role, as development aid for democratic 
consolidation is India’s main field of  activity. Moreover, being able to 
serve as a model of  democracy is the most distinctive aspect of  India’s 
contribution to the enhancement of  democratic governance in other 
developing countries. 
3.2 Definitional problems with ‘democracy’ and ‘democratisation’
3.2.1 Importance of an inclusive and pluralistic democracy
The second problem with the conventional literature of  democracy 
promotion is that its evaluation of  Indian activities and resources for the 
promotion of  democracy is based on an inadequately narrow definition 
of  the term ‘democracy’ to be promoted. My argument here is that it is 
necessary to extend the definition of  democracy by departing from the 
minimalist one advanced by Robert Dahl. Dahl’s concept of  democracy, 
or ‘polyarchy’, is made up of  two components: people’s participation 
in politics through free and periodic elections, and freedom of  political 
speech (freedom of  public contestation) (Dahl 2000). It is clear that 
these two components are vital for democracy; however, they are the 
minimum requirements of  democracy. The problem is that Dahl misses 
the indispensable elements for tackling the daunting challenge prevalent 
in many developing countries: that democracy must be consolidated 
in tandem with the projects of  nation-building and state-building 
within the inherently hostile environment of  a divided society.6 Here, 
nation-building refers to the creation of  common national identities 
that serve as a locus of  loyalty that trumps attachments to tribe, region, 
or ethnic group (Fukuyama 2015: 39). Also, state-building is defined as 
the creation of  a political organisation that possesses a monopoly on 
legitimate coercion and exercises that power over a defined territory 
(Fukuyama 2015: 9–10).
In a divided society, the ethnic, cultural, and religious minorities are 
doomed to be constant minorities in the political scene, no matter how 
many times ‘free and fair elections’ are implemented; the minorities 
are therefore virtually marginalised from the political decision-making 
process. In other words, the interchangeability of  the majority and 
the minority is not guaranteed through the electoral process. From the 
viewpoint of  minorities in such situations, elections, parliament, and 
laws are nothing more than instruments of  the ‘tyranny of  majority’, if  
the majoritarian will expressed through elections is deemed omnipotent 
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in legislative and political decision making. Worryingly enough, Jon 
Elster’s concern that after democratic transitions in Eastern European 
countries, ‘dictatorship by communists was just replaced by majoritarian 
dictatorship’ (Elster 1992: 19) is now becoming a reality in many other 
countries. In such situations, the cleavage between the majority and the 
minorities would be hard to overcome, and any sense of  national unity 
beyond parochial ethnic or religious group identities would be difficult 
to form, thus making the projects of  nation-building and state-building 
remote goals. Indeed, this is the very problem that dominates politics in 
many ‘fragile’ or ‘failed’ states. 
In this regard, it is worth noting that India emphasises the importance 
of  inclusive and pluralistic democracy to make democracy sustainable and 
enduring. The former prime minister, Manmohan Singh, said that both 
authoritarianism and majoritarianism are an aberration, and that: 
Our commitment to democracy is conjoined with a commitment to 
the deeper values of  pluralism and liberalism. India’s embrace of  
diversity as an essential ingredient of  our democracy what today is 
characterised as multiculturalism is deeply rooted in our culture… 
This is a model of  democratic practice that has great relevance to 
this fractured world, in which we often hear seductive arguments 
equating ethnicity or language or religion with nationhood. Such 
flawed hypotheses do not create states or civilisations. Democracy 
cannot be based on exclusion; it has to be inclusive because it 
celebrates plurality… Multicultural nations like ours, will remain the 
targets of  the protagonists of  bigotry because our societies invalidate 
their thesis (Singh 2004).
This notion of  inclusive and pluralistic democracy, which embraces 
ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity, is the defining characteristic 
of  Indian democracy and a model that has been emulated by other 
developing countries striving for the triple challenge of  nation-building, 
state-building, and the consolidation of  democracy. The point to be 
noted here is that India itself  has long been, and still is, facing this 
daunting challenge of  building a functioning and legitimate state, 
coherent nation, and sustainable democracy. It means that India has 
been, and still is, grappling to overcome the malfunction and corruption 
of  the government, exclusion and marginalisation of  particular groups, 
and the resultant activation of  parochial ethnic and religious identities, 
communal violence, and secessionist movements. In other words, India’s 
historical challenge has been to translate the ideal of  constitutional 
democracy as epitomised in the Indian Constitution into practice and to 
realise an inclusive and pluralistic democracy.
3.2.2 Importance of prudent constitutional design
Having said that, inclusive and pluralistic democracy is a vague notion. 
It needs to be institutionalised in a constitution and duly exercised 
through actual implementation, interpretation, and reinterpretation 
of  the constitution. Focusing on constitutions is important, as 
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democratisation never fails to be accompanied by the drafting of  a 
new constitution. Additionally, a constitution is critical for the future 
of  a country not only as it establishes a government framework and 
new rules of  the political game, but also as it stipulates the defining 
characteristics of  a newly established state, polity, and nation. Especially, 
it is a powerful instrument to inscribe a particular version of  ‘We, the 
People’ in a divided society that is grappling with the definition of  its 
unity (Malagodi 2010: 57). 
The imminent problem in drafting a new constitution is that democratic 
transition does not necessarily guarantee the formulation of  a 
constitution that works as a solid base for an inclusive and pluralistic 
democracy. Worryingly, in many developing countries Elster’s concern 
for ‘majoritarian dictatorship’ becomes a reality during the process 
of  constitutional drafting. The advent of  the so-called ‘constitutional 
nationalism’ is a manifestation of  such danger. ‘Constitutional 
nationalism’ is a term that was coined by Robert Hyden in his 
examination of  the situation in the newly independent republics of  the 
former Yugoslavia, and is defined as ‘a constitutional and legal structure 
that privileges the members of  one ethnically defined nation over other 
residents in a particular [polyethnic] state’ (Hyden 1992: 655, emphasis 
added). Under this regime, a nation is defined not in civic terms but 
in the ethnic or religious terms of  the dominant majority group; this 
results in the legal, political, social, and cultural exclusion and alienation 
of  other minorities. In other words, constitutional nationalism 
undermines the creation of  an inclusive and pluralistic democracy. 
The danger of  ‘constitutional nationalism’ is especially imminent in 
India’s neighbouring states of  Nepal (Malagodi 2013a: 1), Bhutan, 
and Sri Lanka. For instance, in Nepal’s first democratically drafted 
constitution, which came into force in 1990, the Nepali nation was 
defined in the ethno-cultural terms of  the dominant ethnic group, 
namely, Hinduism, the Shah monarchy, and the Nepali language, 
in defiance of  the country’s remarkable ethno-cultural, religious, 
and linguistic diversity.7 As Malagodi put it, the 1990 Constitution 
provided ‘a homogenising vision of  how Nepalis ought to be’ (Malagodi 
2010: 76). Worse still, no institutional measures aimed at protecting 
minorities, such as a federal system, reservation of  seats in parliament 
for minorities, or affirmative action, were adopted in the Constitution. 
As a result, minorities felt that they were excluded and marginalised. 
The government was blamed for discriminating against and excluding 
many social groups on the basis of  ethnicity, religion, or language 
(Malagodi 2013a: 3). The Constitution was accused of  institutionalising 
and legitimising discrimination and exclusion of  minorities, and 
thereby failing to guarantee fundamental rights, in particular, the right 
to equality. Thus, the Constitution progressively became an embattled 
document. Political instability was exacerbated, and civil war ensued 
when the Communist Party of  Nepal (Maoist) launched an armed 
struggle against the government in 1996, claiming to rectify the 
inequality prevalent under the Constitution. 
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This example testifies to the importance of  prudent constitutional 
design as a means of  ensuring the smooth functioning of  inclusive 
and pluralistic democracy by entrenching the protection of  minorities. 
More concretely, a civic rather than an ethnic definition of  the word 
‘nation’; a guarantee of  a minority’s cultural, religious, and linguistic 
rights; the separation of  powers; an independent and active judiciary; 
the separation of  state and religion; and self-government by minorities 
via federal arrangements, are vitally important. Furthermore, to rectify 
the situation where marginalised people are substantially deprived of  
the opportunity to participate in the political and judicial processes, 
constitutionally entrenched measures for their empowerment are 
indispensable. 
Having said that, as James Madison sarcastically said (1788), a 
constitution itself  is a mere ‘parchment barrier’ that is too meagre 
to check and contain the arbitrariness of  the political strongmen or 
majoritarian will expressed through elections. Hence, constitutional 
democracy must be exercised through the vibrant implementation 
of  constitutional provisions: the separation of  powers as a system 
of  checks and balances must be well functioning, and, above all, the 
courts must be bold enough to challenge the democratic government 
when its behaviour is unconstitutional and infringes on minority 
rights. In summary, the inculcation and maintenance of  sustainable 
norms and cultures of  constitutional democracy is a sine qua non for 
the consolidation of  inclusive and pluralistic democracy (Harbeson 
2013: 88).
4 India’s unique role as a facilitator of constitutional democracy
As the discussion so far suggests, inclusive and pluralistic democracy 
should be a form of  democratic governance for developing countries 
that consolidates democracy and makes it sustainable. In order for 
inclusive and pluralistic democracy to be consolidated, it must be 
institutionalised in a constitution and duly implemented. This means 
that contributions to the promotion of  democratic governance in 
developing countries must be discussed and evaluated accordingly. From 
this perspective, two facts are important for examining India’s unique 
role as a facilitator of  democratic governance. 
The first point to be noted is that India’s constitution is one of  the 
oldest of  any developing country and is virtually the only constitution 
that has been vibrantly implemented almost without suspension or 
significant amendments to its fundamental structure. The remarkable 
experience of  Indian constitutional democracy is widely studied, 
utilised, and referred to by many developing countries, especially by 
neighbouring states and African countries. The second fact is that 
India has been offering assistance for constitutional drafting to other 
developing countries, thereby making the most of  its own experience 
with constitutional democracy. These two facts will be explored further 
in the following sub-sections. 
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4.1 The attractiveness of Indian constitutional democracy
The attractiveness of  Indian constitutional democracy is evident in the 
fact that the country’s experience is often referred to and utilised in 
other developing countries. Overall structures, individual provisions, 
institutions, case law, and the underlying ideals and norms of  the Indian 
constitution have been studied by the constitutional drafters of  countries 
such as South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Nepal, Bhutan, and Malaysia. 
For example, the Constitutional Commission of  Uganda chose four 
foreign constitutions that they then referred to when drafting the new 
Ugandan constitution in the late 1980s – the Indian constitution was 
the only one from a developing country (Odoki 2005: 83). Not only was 
the Indian constitution studied but some institutions were emulated and 
introduced by other countries. For example, public interest litigation 
(PIL), an Indian constitutional innovation and powerful institution for 
the empowerment of  the marginalised in accessing judicial procedures, 
was introduced in South Asian countries such as Bangladesh, Nepal, 
and Bhutan as well as African countries such as South Africa, Kenya, 
Uganda, Zambia, and Tanzania (Oloka-Onyango 2015). In addition, 
case law accumulated in the course of  the implementation of  the 
Constitution and judgments by the Indian Supreme Court are often 
referred to and cited in the judgments of  courts in other countries.8 
Needless to say, the common historical experience of  being colonised 
and governed by the British Empire and the resultant proximity 
between the legal systems partly explains the above-mentioned flow of  
knowledge and experiences between India and the adjacent countries 
and anglophone African states. In particular, neighbouring states had 
been exposed to the British model of  legal and political institutions as 
revised in the Indian context, and as a result this Anglo-Indian model 
was the institutional framework with which many leaders of  those states 
were most familiar and comfortable (Go 2002). 
However, a more important factor in explaining the attractiveness 
of  Indian constitutional democracy is that the Indian Constitution 
was virtually the first constitution designed to tackle the challenge of  
building a thriving democracy, coherent nation, and functioning and 
legitimate state simultaneously. The Indian Constitution was adopted in 
1950 and is one of  the oldest constitutions of  any developing country. 
The constitution is the fruit of  deliberations by constitutional framers 
facing the imminent danger of  failing to create an ‘Indian’ nation and 
democracy, and the dismemberment of  the state. It is a well-balanced 
hybrid of  imported and indigenous components, and it opened up an 
‘innovative period of  alternative constitutional arrangements shaped 
by the difficulties of  underdevelopment and cultural diversity’ (Klug 
2000: 11). The constitution introduced the parliamentary system of  its 
colonial master, whereas the Bill of  Rights was adopted mainly from 
the constitution of  the United States. In contrast, affirmative action 
measures to empower minorities and the poor were largely home-grown. 
For example, PIL was created and developed out of  a series of  case law 
formulated from the judgments of  the Supreme Court of  India.
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Another important factor is that Indian constitutional democracy has 
survived under the inhospitable conditions of  multiple ethnic, religious, 
and cultural cleavages and a hierarchical social structure. The Indian 
Constitution has been exercised almost uninterruptedly since its 
adoption in 1950. The only interruption of  Indian constitutional rule 
was the 21-month period of  a State of  Emergency from June 1975 to 
March 1977 declared by Indira Gandhi’s administration. However, 
the events after the ‘Emergency’ demonstrated the resilience of  Indian 
democracy: the Congress Party suffered a crushing defeat in the election 
in 1977, and the prime minister herself  lost her seat in the Parliament. 
As Hewitt observed, ‘the sheer decisiveness through which the Indian 
electorate reaffirmed its commitment to an elected parliament, gave 
the event widespread international coverage, and became part of  
the mystique of  India as the world’s largest democracy’ (Hewitt 
2008: 13). The separation of  powers functions well, and the Supreme 
Court is sometimes bold enough to declare parliamentary laws to be 
unconstitutional and thus null and void. PIL is actively utilised in favour 
of  the marginalised. In this sense, it would not be an exaggeration to 
argue that India is virtually the sole example of  a developing country 
that has been operating successfully under a constitutional democracy 
for such a long time. The prudent structure of  the Indian Constitution 
and its long-standing and vibrant implementation have raised its 
status to one of  the most studied constitutions in the world (Khilnani, 
Raghavan and Thiruvengadam 2013: 12–13). 
4.2 India’s support for the promotion of constitutional democracy
The attractiveness of  Indian constitutional democracy as a relevant 
model is a solid foundation for India to continue to promote 
constitutional democracy, especially constitutional drafting in other 
developing countries. To begin with, in 1947 the Indian government 
dispatched B.N. Rau, a member of  the Indian Constituent Assembly 
and a father of  the Indian Constitution, to Rangoon to assist with the 
drafting of  a democratic constitution (Gupta 2013: 85). Since then, 
India has assisted with constitutional drafting in Nepal, Sri Lanka, 
South Africa, Uganda, and Tanzania. Most recently, India helped 
with the drafting of  Bhutan’s first constitution in 2008 by dispatching 
K.K. Venugopal, a senior advocate of  the Supreme Court of  India, to 
assist. Moreover, in 2014 the Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma 
Swaraj pledged India’s continuous support for the constitutional 
drafting process in Nepal. A noteworthy fact is that in many cases India 
was the only developing country to extend assistance of  this kind. For 
example, its support for the making of  a constitution in Uganda in 
the late 1980s was provided in conjunction with Australia, Canada, 
Denmark, West Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, 
which are all developed countries (Odoki 2005: 34). 
Supporting constitutional drafting in other countries is an inherently 
difficult endeavour, since a constitution is a country’s most fundamental 
legal and political document and hence its drafting is a politically 
sensitive process in which the presence of  foreign advisors could easily 
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be interpreted as infringement of  constitutional autonomy. This is 
particularly true of  India’s engagement in constitution-making in other 
countries, because of  its intimidating size and power, as well as India’s 
previous ‘Indira Doctrine’ – an interventionist foreign policy toward 
its neighbours. One of  the most illustrative incidences of  how difficult 
it is for India to engage in the constitutional affairs of  its neighbours 
was the intervention by the then prime minister, Indira Gandhi, in the 
ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. In 1987, India brokered a peace agreement 
between warring parties and put pressure on Colombo to relinquish 
the constitutionally entrenched ‘Sinhalese-first policy’ and to accept 
a constitutional amendment to accommodate the demand of  ethnic 
minority Tamils. The Indian ‘advice’ was to introduce an India-like 
decentralised governance system to expand the autonomy of  Tamils, 
as well as to elevate the Tamil language to the status of  an official 
language alongside Sinhalese (Jacobsohn and Shankar 2013: 196). 
The Sri Lankan government’s reticent acceptance of  India’s ‘advice’ 
elicited violent protests by the majority Sinhalese, which resulted in the 
reoccurrence of  civil conflict. After the adoption of  the Gujral Doctrine 
in 1996, in which India pledged a new neighbourhood diplomacy 
designed to foster mutual trust among South Asian countries, India 
abstained from taking a high-handed policy of  interventionism in order 
to win the confidence of  neighbouring countries that it would no longer 
conduct ‘big stick diplomacy’.
Having said that, India cannot afford to be indifferent to the 
constitutional arrangements of  its neighbours, as it duly recognises 
that ‘constitutional nationalism’ would bring about political and social 
destabilisation in adjacent countries and thus threatens India’s own 
security. Therefore, the dilemma for India is that it must eschew any 
high-handed actions that could be interpreted by recipient countries as 
India’s undue intervention in domestic affairs, while at the same time 
it must make sure that its neighbours formulate a solid constitutional 
foundation for an inclusive and pluralistic democracy.
However, the conditions favourable to India strengthening its 
engagement are being put into place. First, inclusive and pluralistic 
democracy is steadily being adopted in neighbouring countries. For 
instance, in Nepal, the argument that the majoritarian democracy 
adopted in the 1990 Constitution should be replaced by more inclusive 
and pluralistic democracy has gained impetus, and, as a result, 
elements of  ‘constitutional nationalism’ in the 1990 Constitution were 
substantially eradicated from the Interim Constitution adopted in 2007 
(Malagodi 2013b). 
Second, in neighbouring countries where antipathy and vigilance 
against India is still prevalent, a willingness to learn from the Indian 
experience is growing. This is partly because these countries have begun 
to learn from the bitter experiences of  constitutional nationalism in 
the past. For instance, legal experts in Nepal are increasingly ready to 
learn from the Indian experience of  constitutional democracy. The 
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argument given by Bipin Adhikari, dean of  the Kathmandu University 
School of  Law, seems to suggest this change. He argues that most of  
the important modern examples of  success in getting a new democratic 
constitution through an elected constituent assembly, including an Indian 
one, have some common features, such as the presence of  a charismatic 
leader and a leading political party, and a common commitment to 
constitutional democracy (Adhikari 2010, emphasis added).
In a country where anti-Indian sentiment is still prevalent, it is 
meaningful that an influential legal expert such as Adhikari has 
advocated the need to learn from the Indian experience. This change 
might be a reflection on the constitutional nationalism embodied in the 
1990 Constitution, which was built on ‘the rejection of  the Indian-style 
constitutional approach to socio-cultural diversity’ (Malagodi 
2010: 78). The hand has also been outstretched by the Indian side: 
Indian constitutional lawyers went to Kathmandu to share the Indian 
experience and recommended that their Nepali counterparts learn from 
the Indian failure to manage affirmative action programmes designed 
to empower the estranged ethnic minorities in Darjeeling (Malagodi 
2010: 70). 
The growing interest in the Indian experience is not limited to South 
Asian countries. For instance, in 2012 an international seminar was 
convened in Zambia to discuss the potential of  PIL with financial 
assistance from the India-funded UNDEF. It was argued in the seminar 
that PIL has a high potential to realise the right to health care for 
vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, such as those infected with  
HIV/AIDS, and that it provides a useful avenue for improved access to 
justice (SALC 2012). 
In summary, there are growing prospects for Indian constitutional 
democracy to be a promising model for democratic governance, and 
thus it would be an important resource that India could mobilise for the 
enhancement of  democratic governance in developing countries. India’s 
recent diplomatic effort to impress upon its neighbours its abdication of  
the role of  ‘gendarme of  South Asia’ and the increasing readiness on 
the side of  recipients to accept Indian engagement would enable Indian 
assistance to assume a more apolitical and technical nature, and thus 
further enhance the attractiveness of  Indian constitutional democracy.
5 India’s long history as a promoter of democracy 
India has long been an active provider of  South–South cooperation 
in the field of  democracy promotion with the participation of  a wide 
range of  organisations. The flagship programme for Indian technical 
assistance is the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) 
programme, established in 1964. It is managed by the Ministry of  
External Affairs (MEA), and various government organisations and 
institutions offer a series of  training courses to accommodate trainees 
from other developing countries.
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Among these organisations, the Election Commission of  India (ECI) has 
the longest history and was active before the establishment of  the ITEC. 
Indeed, election in India, or ‘the largest democracy in the world’ (Nehru 
1963: 457), is the ‘world’s biggest carnival of  democracy’ (Chand 2014) 
in terms of  its scale and complexity. Making the most of  their expertise 
in election management, the ECI has been a supporter of  democratic 
elections in other developing countries and has been extending 
assistance for many history-making elections, such as Ethiopia’s first 
general election in 1954 and Cambodia’s first general election after 
the Paris Peace Accord in 1991. In addition, the ECI facilitates the 
exchange of  experiences among developing countries facing the 
challenges of  under-representation of  women and minorities who are 
disadvantaged in exercising their right to vote (PTI 2013). 
It is notable that numerous countries are the beneficiaries of  Indian 
democracy promotion assistance. For example, during the period from 
2010 to 2015, the Bureau of  Parliamentary Studies and Training 
offered training and internship programmes for 566 participants from 
87 countries. Sub-Saharan African countries (e.g. Kenya, Tanzania, 
Uganda, and South Africa) are the largest beneficiaries, followed by 
South Asian countries (e.g. Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan), 
countries from the former Soviet Union (e.g. Belarus, Lithuania, 
Uzbekistan, and Ukraine) and Southeast Asian countries (e.g. Myanmar, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, and the Philippines) (see Figure 1).
6 Conclusion
This article has demonstrated that India plays a unique role in 
facilitating democratic governance in other developing countries by 
making the most of  its own experiences with constitutional democracy. 
Moreover, it has explored the possibility of  assistance for constitutional 
Figure 1 Regional distribution of trainees accommodated by the Bureau of 
Parliamentary Studies and Training, 2010–15
Source Author’s own, calculated from Bureau of Parliamentary Studies and Training data.9
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drafting, which is one of  the least explored issues in the literature on the 
promotion of  democracy, good governance, law and development, and 
development aid.
The implications of  these findings are that the unique experiences, 
norms, and institutions of  developing countries can be more attractive 
than those provided by advanced countries, as they are born out of  
developing countries and are continuously tested in relation to the 
ongoing challenges that many developing countries commonly face.
In Western literature, a long-standing and entrenched belief  that 
Western expertise is based on superior knowledge, science, and 
institutions that are universally applicable has been brought under 
critical investigation (Mawdsley 2012). A sober examination and fair 
recognition of  India’s role in the promotion of  democracy would be 
a good starting point for further investigation into the huge potential 
of  developing countries in facilitating political, economic, and social 
development in fellow developing countries. There is much evidence 
that a network of  knowledge transfer and sharing among developing 
countries has been created (Shimomura and Wang 2015), and future 
research is warranted. 
Notes
* An earlier version of  this article was produced as a JICA-RI Working 
Paper.
1 Senior Research Fellow, JICA Research Institute.
2 One reason for this position relates to India’s diplomatic aspiration 
to garner support from other developing countries and thus to take 
a leadership role in the developing world as a ‘spokesperson of  the 
global South’. Presenting itself  as an ardent promoter of  democracy 
was not a good policy since it was reminiscent of  crusading Western 
interventionism, and thus attracted displeasure from the leaders of  
the undemocratic regimes prevalent in developing countries. The 
other reason is that India had been obliged to remain engaged with 
whichever government was exercising authority in any country in 
its neighbourhood, whether they were democratic or undemocratic 
(Saran 2005). 
3 However, India sometimes joined concerted international efforts 
to demand democratisation. For instance, India’s long-standing 
denouncement of  apartheid in South Africa was apparently a 
demand for democratisation. Also, the Indian government expressed 
support for democratic leader Aung San Suu Kyi and demanded the 
military junta democratise in the face of  coup d’état in Burma in 1988.
4 Pratap Mehta remarked that India promoted Nepalese democracy 
‘more constructively than the thousands of  foreign consultants who 
are distorting that troubled country’s internal negotiating process’ 
(2011: 108).
5 It is clear that the study of  democratisation is shifting its focus from 
democratic transition to democratic consolidation. Nonetheless, studies 
on democracy promotion have failed to change their focus accordingly.
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6 In a divided society, political decision-making on important public 
policies is hampered by the lack of  mutual trust among ethnic groups 
(Choudhry 2008: 5).
7 Nepal has 92 languages, 102 caste and ethnic groups, and 10 religions 
(Malagodi 2010: 56).
8 For instance, the judgment of  South Africa’s Constitutional Court in 
2002 cited the rulings of  the Indian Supreme Court in PIL in dealing 
with the question of  whether courts can enforce the socioeconomic 
rights of  South African citizens.
9 http://164.100.47.194/bpstnew/Participants_Details.aspx.
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